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   Introduction 
 
A number of works have attempted to establish a dialogue between the Austrian 
and Institutionalist Schools, whether to bring out thematic propinquities (Samuels, 
1989
2; Wynarczyk, 1990), conceptual complementarities (Vanberg, 1989)
3, or hardly 
reconcilable oppositions (Hodgson, 1989). 
There are two types of difficulty in attempting to establish a dialogue between 
Austrians and Institutionalists. 
The first difficulty is linked to the necessity to previously define the ‘theoretical sets’ 
we wish to compare. In fact, if we undertake to bring to light the common elements 
between  Austrians and Institutionalists, it is first necessary to determine what make a 
specific author, or a given conception of economic phenomena related to one of these 
two sets.  Numbers of works have attempted to identify ‘Schools’, ‘Research 
Programmes’, ‘Research Traditions’, ‘Paradigms’, when others showed the non-
homogeneous character of both trends of thought
4. In order to reduce the impact of this 
first difficulty, we shall focus the comparison on the respective contributions of Menger 
and Veblen. 
The second difficulty arising from the establishment of such a dialogue lies in the fact 
that it presupposes i) a common language, or at least the possibility of building such a 
language, and ii) common problems which may be used as a basis for this dialogue. The 
first of these conditions  refers to conceptualisation, while the second relates to the 
existence of a common problematic. Actually, the difficulty is that these Schools do not 
set out the problem in the same way and the issue of institutions thus does not come 
within the same context. Within the framework of a paradigmatic vision of the 
evolution of scientific knowledge, we would say, after Kuhn (Kuhn, 1962), that the 3 
 
incommensurability of paradigms makes all conceptual comparison ineffective 
(Feyerabend, 1975). 
Indeed, while the Institutionalists consider that all reflection on the nature and the 
evolution of institutions is necessary to understand the dynamics of individual 
behaviours, the Austrians attempt to explain how institutions emerge unintentionally 
from the dynamics of individual behaviours. If the former study the evolution of already 
existing institutions, the latter look into their origin
5. 
Thus, the debate can only be sterile if, like the former, we consider that the individuals 
behave within a pre-existing framework which the logic of alteration it is essential to 
study and, like the latter, that the origin of institutions may only be analysed on the 
basis of individual actions. 
So it is relevant to solve, within the scope of economics, this difference in problem 
identification which results in diverging views on the importance and the role of a 
reflection on institutions.  
For Menger, who comes within the Smithian perspective, it is essential to set out the 
problem as follows: how is it that individuals produce an order and institutions though 
they do not necessarily behave and consult each other with this aim in view? For 
Veblen, the problem consists in explaining why individual actions show some 
consistency, that is to say why they do not diverge a priori. 
Is it conceivable to reconcile these two views? In other words, can we consider setting 
out the issue of institutions in such a way that we may explain both their origin and the 
nature of their evolution? To this end, we need to know whether it  is possible to 
reconcile the logic of emergence of institutions with the logic of their running. 
Endeavouring to formulate such a problem is of relevance if we consider that the 
institutional framework is a factor of the innovative dynamics and more generally 4 
 
economic changes (Ménard and Shirley, 2005). In this perspective, analysing the 
evolution of this framework constitutes an important theoretical issue. It then seems 
pertinent to examine the factors which account for the emergence and evolution of 
institutions. 
We shall proceed to answer all of the above-identified questions in two phases. In a first 
part, we shall present Menger and Veblen’s conceptions of institutions. This will then 
allow us to study, in a second part, the possibilities of a dialogue about institutions 
between these two authors. 5 
 
 
   I. Menger and Veblen’s Conceptions of Institutions  
 
Without going into our future developments, Veblen and Menger have one thing in 
common, i.e. they refuse any approach which would exclude time as a main factor of 
economic analysis in general, and of the analysis of institutions in particular. This has 
permitted to consider that both had an evolutionary conception of institutions. Our 
presentation of their works will therefore focus on this aspect of their approaches to 
institutions. 
 
   Menger’s Conception of the Origin of Institutions 
 
Menger, the founder of the Austrian School of Economics, considers that one of the 
main tasks – if not the main task – of economists is to explain the origin of institutions 
(C. Menger, 1883, 1963). Langlois thus writes that “C. Menger’s most important 
contribution to economic science was his theory of social institutions” (Langlois, 1989, 
p. 278). When he undertakes to ‘de-homogenise’ Walras, Jevons and Menger, Jaffé 
(1976) describes strangely Menger as an Institutionalist.  
 
The Foundations of Menger’s ‘Evolutionary’ Analysis 
 
Mengers’ conception of institutions comes within the scope of a distinction between the 
exact and realistic-empirical orientation of research in economics
6. While the latter aims 
at establishing regularities between real phenomena, the former, which, for Menger, 
corresponds to a really scientific approach, strives to discover the essence of economic 6 
 
reality, that is to say the ‘strictly typical relationships’ between ‘strictly typical 
phenomena’. In opposition to the critics levelled by the supporters of the ‘historical 
method’, exact theory, even if it tends to identify typical relationships between typical 
phenomena, is not synonymous with ‘timeless’ analysis. On the contrary, its aim is to 
explain the genesis of phenomena: “This genetic element is inseparable from the idea of 
theoretical sciences” (Menger, 1963, p. 94). 
 
“Exact theories are supposed to reveal to us the simplest and strictly typically 
constituent factors (susceptible to exact inquiry) of phenomena and the laws according 
to which complicated phenomena are built up out of the simplest factors. However, they 
fulfil this task completely only by providing us with this understanding in respect to 
each phase of the development of phenomena. Or in other words, they do so by 
teaching us how phenomena are presented at each step of their development as the 
result of a regular genetic process” (Menger, 1963, p. 113). 
 
Thinking that the exact orientation of research does not integrate a ‘historical point of 
view’ therefore constitutes a methodological error, and Menger’s opinion is that the 
supporters of the German Historical School, when they criticise this orientation and 
assert the necessity of founding economics on the historical method, mix historical 
‘method’ up with historical ‘point of view’. It is on this basis that Menger elaborates his 
conception of the origin of institutions. 
 7 
 
The Origin of Institutions: the Scope and Limits of an Analogy between Natural 
Organisms and Social Institutions  
 
For Menger, there are a number of similarities between natural organisms and social 
structures. Both are characterised by the existence of interdependence relationships 
between parts and whole. 
 
“In natural organisms we can observe a complexity almost incalculable in detail, and 
especially a great variety of their parts (single organs). All this variety, however, is 
helpful in the preservation, development, and the propagation of the organisms as 
units”...“We can make an observation similar in many respects in reference to a series 
of social phenomena and human economy in particular” (Menger, 1963, pp. 129-130). 
 
If we now look into the origin of these two types of real phenomena – i.e.  natural 
organisms and  institutions  –, we can notice another similarity: like for natural 
organisms, some social structures emerge and function without them arising from any 
conscious will. These analogies have significant repercussions on the analysis of social 
phenomena in general, and of institutions in particular. 
 
“Now if social phenomena and natural organisms exhibit analogies with respect to their 
nature, their origin, and their function, it is at once clear that this fact cannot remain 
without influence on the method of research in the field of the social sciences in general 
and economics in particular” (idem, p. 130). 
 8 
 
However, this system of analogies must be put into perspective as regards its actual 
content. Indeed, first, some social institutions do not respect the analogy: ‘pragmatic’ or 
‘mechanical’
7 institutions which are the result of a deliberate calculation, of a collective 
will. Second, the parts of a natural organism participate automatically – or more exactly 
without specific behaviour – in the constitution and evolution of the whole, while it is 
not the same for the creation of social institutions. 
 
“They are, rather, the result of human efforts, the efforts of thinking, feeling, acting 
human beings” (idem, p. 133). 
 
Thus, the scope of the analogy is considerably limited. The analogy, reduced to the only 
dimension of the origin of phenomena, will be justified only for these institutions which 
are the unintentional result of individual actions. Menger refers in this case to ‘organic’ 
institutions. As regards pragmatic institutions and as far as the other dimensions of 
organic institutions (nature and function) are concerned, the analogy will be erroneous. 
For Menger, the ‘organic’ approach to the origin of institutions may be conducted 
within the framework of an exact orientation of research. 
 
“The acknowledgement of a number of social phenomena as ‘organisms’ is in no way 
in contradiction to the aspiration for exact (atomistic!) understanding of them” (Menger, 
1963, p. 141). 
 
Menger thus rises up against the collectivist analysis of institutions which regards them 
as units having an origin and evolution which the study of these constituents’ 
behaviours does not manage to explain. He does not call into question the unity of these 9 
 
social structures, but he rather considers that the exact orientation of research in 
economics is in a position to explain their origin and functions.  
 
“What the exact orientation of research strives for is on the one hand the clarification of 
the ‘unity’ of those structures which are designed as social organisms. On the other, it 
strives for the exact explanation of their origin and their function” (Menger, 1963, p. 
143). 
 
Language, religion, the State, and in the economic field, the market, competition, 
money, are unintentionally created  social structures which the exact orientation of 
research can explain. 
In fact, Menger uses exact orientation as a basis to criticise the ‘organicist’ and 
‘collectivist’ approaches to institutions. Institutions like money and the market are not 
organic in the sense that they would exist right away as units and would evolve as such. 
 
The Process of Emergence of ‘Typical Behaviours’  
 
Menger’s proposed example on the origin of money will enable us to clarify this aspect. 
In a paragraph of Problems of Economics and Sociology, in a chapter of Principles of 
Economics, and in an article The Origin of Money, Menger puts forward a specific 
conception of the origin of money. He shows that there is a fundamentally dynamic 
process leading to the emergence of a currency. Though he does acknowledge that some 
currencies may have been the result of a deliberate creation (for example in the 
colonies), he considers a difference should be established between the origin of money, 
regarded as an unintentional institution, and its evolution. Thus, after its creation, a 10 
 
currency takes the form of a ‘rule’ which applies to all. Here we find the idea of a 
“reciprocal conditioning of the whole and its normal functions and the parts” (Menger, 
1963, p. 147). 
It is essential to make a distinction, as mentioned in the introduction, between the origin 
and the evolution of institutions in general and ‘organic’ institutions in particular. We 
shall go back over this aspect of the Mengerian thinking later on. 
As far as the origin of money is concerned, Menger takes a barter situation as his 
starting point. The individuals exchange goods according to their respective needs. But 
the goods are more or less exchangeable on a market
8. In view of this, the individuals 
will be inclined to exchange their possessions for goods which may be exchanged for a 
greater number of other goods. They will thus progressively come to select, amongst 
the most exchangeable goods, one which will be accepted by all in their exchange 
operations. The creation of a currency, which results from the fact that less 
exchangeable goods are exchanged for more exchangeable goods, is therefore 
interesting for all individuals. However, a currency will only exist if the individuals 
understand that their interest, which a priori consists in exchanging their possessions 
for goods they need, is actually to get more exchangeable goods through exchange. 
Here Menger uses the following argument: the individuals gradually come to emulate – 
because they little by little find it to their own advantage – those who agree to exchange 
goods for more exchangeable ones, insofar as direct bartering would not enable them 
easily to get goods that are immediately useful to them. Resorting to this type of 
‘staggered’ exchange brings any individual closer to his ultimate design,  i.e. the 
satisfaction of his needs. Menger thus concludes his analysis on the origin of money: 
 11 
 
“Money, an institution serving the common good in the most outstanding sense of the 
word, can thus, as we saw, come into being legislatively, like other social institutions. 
But this is no more the only way than it is the most original way that money developed. 
This is rather to be sought in the process described above, the nature of which would be 
explained only imperfectly if we wanted to call it ‘organic’, or if we wanted to 
designate money as something ‘primeval’, ‘original’, etc. It is clear, rather, that the 
origin of money can truly be brought to our full understanding only by our learning to 
understand the  social  institution discussed here as the un-intended result, as the 
unplanned outcome of specifically  individual efforts of members of a society” (C. 
Menger, 1963, p. 155). 
 
This example illustrates perfectly the Mengerian conception of the origin of institutions. 
Indeed, the specific knowledge individuals have of their environment and their will to 
satisfy their needs at best drive them to enter into a learning process which 
progressively leads them to select a good that can be exchanged for all others, even 
though there is no collective will in action. 
 
We may derive the following propositions from Menger’s arguments: 
1) When a currency is selected, it establishes itself as a ‘rule’. So, on the one hand, it 
looks as if it had been imposed by a single will and, on the other hand, it cannot be 
subject to revision. No individual will is in a position to call into question the choice 
resulting from the selection process. 
2) It is not possible to know, a priori, which good will be selected. In fact, on the one 
hand, a currency does not exist as long as the selection process is not completed and, on 
the other hand, the physical characteristics of a good do not intervene, as such, in the 12 
 
process of its progressive selection. It is the history of the exchangeability of a good – 
which alters in the course of the selection process  – that conditions its future 
exchangeability. Menger illustrates this ‘genealogy’ of money when he writes that the 
German term ‘geld’ comes from the verb ‘gelten’, which means ‘to compensate’. 
3) At the very beginning of the process, the distribution of the individuals’ choices over 
all of the goods depends on their needs as well as on the way they think they can satisfy 
them. The first choices are even more determining when they give rise to an important 
imbalance in favour of a specific good, that is to say when a high number of individuals 
choose it. 
4) The individuals’ evolution of and change in exchange behaviours have a cognitive 
origin. It is through the medium of a learning process – which Menger sometimes 
confines to mere emulation – that the individuals alter their preferences as regards the 
goods they wish to exchange. 
 
The relative weakness of Menger’s analysis, which compels us to introduce another 
type of approach, lies in his treatment – or more exactly in his non-treatment – of the 
evolution of institutions. Indeed, if he clearly explains the origin of institutions, he is 
not so explicit on the period which follows this creation. Furthermore, unintentionally 
created social institutions are, for Menger, fit to satisfy everyone’s well-being (social 
welfare): in other words, they are the most in a position  to solve problems of 
coordination in an optimal way. However, as Schneider writes in his introduction to the 
American edition of Untersuchungen über die Methoden der Socialwissenschaften und 
der Politischen Oekonomie insbesondere: 
 13 
 
“When Menger answers his question about the rise of unplanned functional institutions 
and points to the fact that out of the pursuit of individual interests ‘happy’ social 
circumstances may arise, there is still much that he leaves untouched and with which 
one would have liked to see him concerned” (Schneider, 1963, p. 12). 
 
The institutionalist approach seems to us pertinent here, and perhaps  even 
complementary. Indeed, on the one hand, Veblen emphasises the selection process of 
institutions and, on the other hand, he criticises the assertion according to which 
institutions would be fit to satisfy social welfare. 
 
  Veblen and the Evolution of Institutions 
 
Veblen’s analysis of institutions is linked to his will to conceive an evolutionary 
economic theory. Thus, the criticism he levels at ‘classic’ economic theory is that it 
boils down to a taxonomical system and is, on this basis, pre-Darwinian (Veblen, 
1898)
9. However, Veblen’s analysis of institutions cannot be apprehended without 
referring to the pragmatic anchorage which characterises the ‘Old Institutional 
Economics’. 
 
The Pragmatic Foundations of the Veblenian Evolutionism 
 
This philosophical inspiration permeates all of Veblen’s  works and enriches the 
evolutionary methodology which he regards as the paradigm of new science
10.  He 
espouses Darwin’s views that science has to search for causality in the social realm, that 
social as well as natural evolution is the key element scientists have to deal with and 14 
 
that individuals are not rational calculators willing to satisfy their own desires are 
embedded in the social world and act on the basis of habits of thought that this 
embeddedness creates. All those elements are common both to Darwin and the 
pragmatists. “Although Veblen rarely spelt out such matters in sufficient details, I 
submit that this pragmatist conception of action is entirely consistent with his own 
expressed views, and its adoption is explicable in terms of knowledge of the ideas of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey.” (Hodgson, 2004a, p. 350).  
On the one hand, the nature of the relationships between the preconceptions of 
economic science and the particular circumstances which produce them and, on the 
other hand, the evolution of these preconceptions permit to make explicit the pragmatist 
foundations of Veblen’s evolutionism. He thus writes: 
 
“For this purpose it may be sufficient to point out that the preconception in question 
belongs to the generation in which the Physiocrats lived, and that it is the guiding norm 
of all serious thought that found ready assimilation into the common sense of that time” 
(Veblen, 1899, p. 133). 
 
Veblen is certainly aware that the Physiocratic anchorage in a natural order endures, but 
he considers that this persistence constitutes a version of it which may be described as 
‘denatured’ insofar as it does not tally any more with the present circumstances. So, 
with regard to the break which Hume introduces in this view of things, he thus points 
out: 
 
“To explain the characteristic animus for which Hume stands, on grounds that might 
appeal to Hume, we should have to inquire into the peculiar circumstances – ultimately 15 
 
material circumstances – that have gone to shape the habitual view of things within the 
British community, and that so have acted to differentiate the British preconceptions 
from the French, or from the general range of preconceptions prevalent on the 
Continent” (Veblen, 1899, p. 136). 
 
Defining preconceptions within the scope of “peculiar circumstances” expresses the 
consubstantial nature of the concepts and perceptions, that is to say the fact that we 
“hang perceptions on concepts, and concepts on perceptions, without distinction and 
indefinitely” (James, 1926, p. 132). This is summed up in the following “pragmatic 
formula”: 
 
“The pragmatic formula lays it down that the meaning of a concept can always be 
found, if not in some particular sensory reality which it serves to designate, at least in 
some characteristic of human experience which its existence will make true” (James, 
1926, p. 75). 
 
So, the explanation of a divergence between the English and French preconceptions 
does not rest on a difference in terms of reality, but in terms of relationship with this 
reality. It therefore needs to be evaluated in view of the specific modes of cultural 
learning. 
 
“Divergence is visible in the higher syntheses, the methods of handling the material of 
knowledge, the basis of valuation of the facts taken up, rather than in the material of 
knowledge. But this divergence must be set down to a cultural difference, a difference 
of point of view, not to a difference of inherited information. When a given body of 16 
 
information passes the national frontiers it acquires a new complexion, a new national, 
cultural physiognomy. It is this cultural physiognomy of learning that is here under 
inquiry” (Veblen, 1899, p. 138). 
 
This pragmatic inspiration permits to identify the Veblenian unit of the selection 
process. 
 
The Unit of Selection 
 
For Veblen, if economics means to be an evolutionary science, economic action must 
constitute its subject. But this economic action does not solve itself through the 
Hedonistic impulse which the economists retain to found the homo economicus. 
 
 “He is not simply a bundle of desires that are to be saturated by being placed in the 
path of the forces of the environment, but rather a coherent structure of propensities and 
habits which seeks realization and expression in an unfolding activity. According to this 
view, human activity, and economic activity among the rest, is not apprehended as 
something incidental to the process of saturating given desires” (Veblen, 1898, p. 390). 
 
This conception comes within the scope of a pragmatic view of human action. Veblen 
expresses it when he writes: 
 
“The activity is itself the substantial fact of the process, and the desires under whose 
guidance of action takes place are circumstances of temperament which determine the 
specific direction in which the activity will unfold itself in a  given case. These 17 
 
circumstances of temperament are ultimate and definitive for the individual who acts 
under them, so far as regards his attitude as agent in the particular action in which he is 
engaged” (Veblen, 1898, p. 390). 
 
For Veblen, the analysis of change rests on the notion of ‘cumulative causation’. 
Analysing the history of human actions thus entails identifying the body of 
determinations acting upon them. It is all of the habits of thought that form the content 
of this body. 
 
“The base of action – the point of departure – at any step in the process is the entire 
organic complex of habits of thought that have been shaped by the past process” 
(Veblen, 1898, pp. 392-93). 
 
The evolution of institutions therefore permits to explain the history of human actions 
insofar as these are determined by habits of thought. Selection then applies to 
institutions. And institutions constitute units of selection. Veblen thus refers to a 
selection of the habits of thought that are deemed fittest to enable the individuals to 
adapt to environmental changes. So, it is the analysis of the selection process of 
institutions that constitutes one of the theoretical issues of the Veblenian approach.  
 
The Selection Process 
  
For Veblen, the unit of selection is also a factor of selection. Hodgson observes it full 
well when he writes that, in the Veblenian approach, “institutions are both replicators 18 
 
and the units of selection in socioeconomic evolution” (Hodgson, 1992, p. 288). Veblen 
thus writes: 
 
“Institutions are not only themselves the result of a selective and adaptive process 
which shapes the prevailing or dominant types of spiritual attitude and aptitudes; they 
are at the same time special methods of life and human relations, and are therefore in 
their turn efficient factors of selection. So that the changing institutions in their turn 
make for a further selection of individuals endowed with the fittest temperament, and a 
further adaptation of individual temperament and habits to the changing environment 
through the formation of new institutions”  (Veblen, 1899, p. 188).  
 
In this perspective, there is a process of reinforcement of habits of thought. What 
characterises this approach is in fact the assertion of a tendency to institutional inertia. 
For Veblen, behaviours are ‘routinised’, habits of thought are supervised by institutions. 
So there is a process of institutional reinforcement insofar as routine actions are 
inclined to repeat and strengthen what turns them into routine. Hodgson rightly refers to 
the works of Arthur (1989) on lock-in phenomena when he writes: “it would seem that 
the cumulative and self-reinforcing aspect of institutions and routines relates to some 
kind of process of positive feedback”...“Such lock-in phenomena can thus be regarded 
as sufficiently stable units of selection in an evolutionary process” (Hodgson, 1992, pp. 
292-293). 
The existence of a process which leads to this lock-in phenomenon is implicit in the 
reading which Rutherford makes of the Veblenian analysis of institutions. Indeed, as 
Rutherford underlines, beyond the external dynamics of institutions arising from the 
conflicting relations between institutions as crystallisers of habits of action and thought 19 
 
and technological changes as ‘bringers’ of new habits of action and thought, institutions 
are the scene of an internal dynamics too (Rutherford, 1984). “Institutional systems do 
not, of course, spring fully formed from the start” (Rutherford, 1984, p. 334). On the 
one hand, institutional principles are inclined to ‘contaminate’ the other authorities of 
social reality. “In this manner any institutional system tends, over time, to become 
internally coherent and highly interrelated or ‘possessed of a certain systematic 
solidarity’” (idem, p. 334). On the other hand, there is the emergence of a process 
which, in the course of time, tends to induce a refinement of institutions. Finally: 
“institutional conventions come to find expressions in laws and constitutions and in 
particular organizational forms” (idem). 
These three processes tend to give rise to a crystallisation of institutions – a lock-in 
phenomenon – which thus leads to increase institutional inertia. However, in Veblen’s 
approach, there is a tension between the different habits of thought which results in an 
institutional dynamics. Indeed, from the point of view of Darwinian evolutionism, 
selection presupposes a process which accounts for the variation in the units of 
selection, unless we consider there is a final end to evolution – which Veblen does not 
do, unlike Marx whom he may have criticised for doing so. 
 
The Problem of Variation 
 
In the analysis of institutions as units and factors of selection, there is a conception of 
institutional change coming into play. However, the evolutionary dynamics does not 
come within the framework of a dialectical conception of change
11. Veblen considers 
that men must adapt to industrial life insofar as their patterns of thought partly reflect 
their patterns of life, and that they must conform to the social, civic, military and 20 
 
religious interests which do “not commonly coincide with the training given by 
industry” (Veblen, 1899, p. 143). It seems to us that a connection should be established 
between this pragmatic tension and the Peircean conception of modes of being. Peirce 
distinguishes three modes of being which he sums up as follows:  
 
“Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without 
reference to anything else. Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it 
is, with respect to a second but regardless of any third. Thirdness is the mode of being 
of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other” 
(Peirce, 1978, p. 72). 
 
In our view, the Peircean conception of the three modes of being is liable to serve as a 
foundation for Veblen’s evolutionary methodology, even if he does not explicitly refer 
to it in his approach to institutional changes. Man, as an acting being, is in actual 
contact with the world (secondness), which is supposed to have a potential existence 
(firstness). But the possibility of anticipating presupposes that this embeddedness in 
actuality is projectable into the future through laws which reveal the future features of 
secondness. For Peirce,  thirdness is that which mediates between firstness and 
secondness, that which creates a ‘process’. This conception permits to found the theory 
according to which man is caught up in the world’s actuality when he thinks and acts, 
but these modes of thought and action do not result from a single adaptation. That is 
why i) there is a variation and selection in habits of thought, ii) human action is, for 
Veblen, the subject of the evolutionary economic science, and finally iii) the Veblenian 
methodology cannot be but holistic. 
 21 
 
The weakness of Veblen’s analysis of i nstitutions is the parallel he draws between 
instincts and institutions. On the one hand, his analysis of instincts is particularly 
confused (Pribram, 1986); on the other, the connections he establishes between 
instincts, habits of thought and social institutions are not coherent (Walker, 1977). 
Hodgson underlines it when he thus writes about the link between instincts and 
institutions: 
 
“But, as we have noted, this lack of sufficient explanation, alongside brilliant insight, is 
one of the frustrating and characteristic features of Veblen’s writing” (Hodgson, 1989, 
p. 288).  
 
Two things need however to be stressed. First as Hodgson points out “the validity or 
otherwise of this point should be a matter not of prejudice against the concept of 
instinct but of scientific investigation.” (Hodgson, 2004a, p. 353). Second institutions 
may be conceived as bundles of weighted instincts. Third, it might also be considered 
that idle-curiosity is an instinct that motivates discovery and novelty (Witt, 2008). 
 
 It seems h owever that this difficulty lies fundamentally in Veblen’s very ambition. 
Indeed, Veblen endeavours to present a theory of the evolution of institutions, and not 
an analysis of their origin
12. What he means to show is how institutions are renewed, 
how they  come into conflict, on account of their inertia, with the evolutionary 
necessities which technological changes bring about. Unlike Menger, it is not so much 
the origin of institutions which constitutes the centre of gravity of his analysis as the 
evolutionary logic which the institutions carry within them. If institutions constitute 
units of selection, it is inconceivable to produce a theory that integrates their absence. 22 
 
That is why it may seem impossible, for Veblen, to build, on the basis of these 
foundations, a coherent theory which explains both the origin and the evolution of 
institutions. 
 
We may sum up this exposition of Veblen and Menger’s analyses of institutions as 
follows: the former looks into the evolution of routines while the latter attempts to 
explain the constitution of these  routines. Veblen regards routines as the units of 
selection whereas for Menger, individual behaviours, or more exactly knowledge as a 
base for behaviours, are the units of selection, routine being only the result of selection. 
In the Austrian perspective, the variation is ensured by the assertion of the individuals’ 
fundamental specificity in terms of knowledge, and so in terms of behaviour. In the 
institutionalist perspective, this institutional variation arises from the relationship 
between the evolution of the ways of acting and of thinking which the technological 
dynamics produces by modifying the individuals’ modes of immersion into an 
instrumented reality and the internal dynamics of institutions. 
 
Is it possible to reconcile these two approaches which are conflicting only if the origin 
and evolution of institutions are put on the same level? 
 
The thesis we propose is the following: the setting-up of new institutions, coming into 
contradiction with the former ones, b rings to light breaks in individual behaviours 
which progressively come to create a real institutional paradigm. On the basis of this 
institutional paradigm, a coherent set of institutions tends to be set up to the detriment 
of the former, without this selection process being either immediate or necessarily total. 
Old institutions may thus endure, which no longer constitute a ‘stake’ insofar as, first, 23 
 
they are not likely to be replaced by any other and, second, they do not hamper the 
development of the institutions’ deployment process. Finally, the old institutions’ 
resistance capacity can limit the generalisation of new behavioural routines. 
In our opinion, the above thesis does not seem to be incompatible with either the 
Mengerian or the Veblenian conception. We even consider that it is liable to solve the 
former conception’s difficulty explaining the evolution of the institutions set up, and the 
latter conception’s difficulty explaining how a new institution emerges.  
Going deeper into this thesis will enable us to justify this viewpoint. 
 
   II. The Conditions of a ‘Dialogue’ between Menger and Veblen 
 
While Menger’s works come within an Aristotelian perspective, as shown by Kauder 
(1957), Veblen’s theses are inspired by pragmatic philosophy. If we place ourselves at 
this level to compare the two authors, it then appears obvious that there is a 
fundamental incompatibility between the philosophical roots of their respective 
conceptions of institutions. If we place ourselves at the methodological level, we can 
see that Menger is a keen advocate of methodological individualism, while Veblen is 
generally viewed as having embedded his works in methodological holism
13. So, if we 
evaluate the comparison between these two conceptions of institutions in view of the 
epistemological and methodological characteristics of Menger and Veblen’s 
‘thoughts’
14, and if we attempt a term-for-term comparison, that is to say level-for-
level, of the epistemological, methodological and theoretical contents of these thoughts, 
the dialogue is only possible in terms of opposition. 
However, there is the possibility of a dialogue if we consider that both theorists propose 
an evolutionary approach to institutions within which framework they develop an 24 
 
analysis where  i)  each moment of the evolution of institutions is only intelligible 
according to all of the moments which preceded it,  ii) irreversibility is an essential 
feature of this evolution, iii) it is impossible to anticipate the result of this evolution, 
and iv) evolution is a ‘self-supporting’ process. This means that the comparison must be 
evaluated not by referring to one or the other level at which solutions are brought, but in 
terms of the method which permits to analyse the process in its entirety. In this 
perspective, the dialogue is possible if we define an encompassing problematics where 
the logics of emergence and running of institutions are mobilised from the angle of an 
evolutionary approach to institutions. 
How can this encompassing problematics be clarified? 
When Menger explains the origin of institutions, he assumes that the individuals learn 
from the others’ behaviour and alter their actions accordingly. In that sense, Streissler is 
right to write: “the stress on informational content is one of the respects in which 
Menger was very modern” (Streissler, 1972, p. 432). According to him, the “Mengerian 
man” is always trying to enhance his knowledge. 
 
“He is constantly trying to increase his knowledge, creating social institutions to gather 
information, empowering growing droves of middlemen to act on his behalf. Still less 
than about the present does he know about the future. Again and again Menger stresses 
the time dimension of goods and the amount of  uncertainty this entails” (Streissler, 
1972, p. 433). 
 
This learning is yet possible only if the individuals have sufficient understanding of the 
other individuals’ action. It is therefore necessary, unless we solve the problem in von 
Mises’ way and suppose that human action is defined by a certain number of a priori 25 
 
categories, to  consider a common space of knowledge which permits this 
understanding. There is therefore no situation of absence of institutions, rules of 
thought. This observation allows us to define the status which is to be given to the 
Mengerian conception of the origin of organic institutions. As Vanberg quite rightly 
points out: 
 
“It is not an attempt to account for the particular historical record of a specific case, that 
is, of a concrete historical example of institution. It is, rather, an attempt to provide 
some general theoretical understanding of the kind of process by which, in principle, 
the kind of institution that is to be explained could have emerged under conditions that 
can plausibly be assumed to have existed” (Vanberg, 1989, p. 339). 
 
This common knowledge serves as a basis for the progressive selection of a typical 
behaviour, be it within the framework of an exchange of goods, spatial location, etc. 
There therefore is a set of institutions defined, which rests on the ‘lock-in’ of 
behaviours becoming routine, and any deviation involves a cost which may be 
described as irrecoverable. It is the irrecoverable nature of deviance cost which in fact 
accounts for the possibility of occurrence of deviant behaviours. The example of the 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur is exemplary here. Even if or because he is not the one 
who insures the risk which the implementation of a new productive combination entails, 
his behaviour is deviant. And the fact that he is emulated by his peers, through a 
learning phenomenon, gradually comes to generalise this deviant behaviour. In this 
connection,  Perroux points out that in  The Theory of Economic Development, 
Schumpeter does not give us a ‘theory of evolution’ (development), but a ‘theory of 
triggering’ (start-up) (Perroux, 1935, p. 121) – which justifies the fact of regarding 26 
 
Schumpeter as an ‘Austrian’ here. The coverage of deviance costs is progressive and 
subject to the success of its generalisation. 
The triggering of such behaviour thus serves as a germ for the deployment of an 
institution. Here we find a logic of emergence. 
 
However, an institution will only establish itself if it is in a position to capture, in an 
incentive or repressive way, the behaviour of a sufficient part of a population. This 
phenomenon does not only induce  a competition between individuals with specific 
behaviours, but also between institutions. The argument here is closely akin to the 
works of Veblen and, as Leathers (1990) underlines, of Hayek, which show that the unit 
of selection is a set of rules of conduct. Once behaviours become routine, selection no 
longer focuses on individual behaviours, but on routines.  That is why we think, after 
Hodgson, that it is justified to regard routines as units of selection. 
 
In the process of institutional evolution, it is therefore necessary to consider two logical 
moments, which are characterised by two different units of selection. The first relates to 
the selection of behaviours, that is to say that typical behaviours emerge progressively 
from the constitution of individual behaviours. The second refers to the competition 
between routines, namely between typical behaviours. It is the superposition of these 
two moments which seems to us likely to account for the institutional dynamics. Indeed 
it seems possible to sum up these arguments in saying that the key difference between 
Menger and Veblen is that Menger concentrates on the ontogenetic development of a 
single institution, whereas Veblen concentrates on the evolutionary selection 




It is necessary to complete this description  of the two moments of the institutional 
dynamics with a presentation of the reasons for the imbalance which the emergence of 
deviant behaviours constitutes. We have observed that, for Veblen,  it is the tension 
between institutional inertia and new habits of thought, which technological evolution 
entails,  that accounts for the process of replacement  of  institutions  by others.  For 
Menger, the economic dynamics, and especially the institutional dynamics, is the result 
of the irrepressible trend of knowledge progress. 
 
“Nothing is more certain than that the degree of economic progress of mankind will 
still, in future epochs, be commensurate with the degree of progress of human 
knowledge” (Menger, 1976, p. 74). 
 
This increase in knowledge rests on the existence of institutions which appear both as 
the conditions and consequences of it. We are confronted here with a self-referential 
process where the product of a system’s running contains production processes of the 
system itself.  Veblen quite rightly emphasises the significance of this  identification 
when he writes: 
 
“The economic life of the individual is a cumulative process of adaptation of means to 
ends that cumulatively change as the process goes on, both the a gent and his 
environment being at any point the outcome of the past process. His methods of life to-
day are enforced upon him by his habits of life carried over from yesterday and by the 




It seems to us that the behavioural break, whose necessity we have asserted, must be 
introduced in the very space of  that which conditions behaviours.  Technological 
changes  are  in fact  important insofar as they rest on new rules  of  action.  The 
introduction of a new technology therefore presupposes the existence of knowledge-
based anticipations which result in deviant behaviours. It is a break with routine which 
permits the emergence of behaviours compatible with this change. So it is in the space 
of actions – in that they express knowledge – that the origin of this break is to be 
sought. Indeed, asserting that technological changes bring about new rules of action 
does not tell us anything about the extent of the gap between the existing rules of action 
and those which technological changes entail insofar as the latter are already regarded 
as being in place. 
It is in the space of the rules of action – in that they are linked to specific knowledge –
that  we should measure this gap,  instead of deducing it from some authorities  that 
impose themselves from the outside. So it is the progressive  construction  of new 
behaviours which permits to explain the institutional break. And it is the constitution of 
these behaviours which produces new routines. It is thus possible to explain, not only 
the replacement of a routine by another, but also the progressive  formation of new 
routines. 
 
   
 Conclusion 
 
   In this text, I meant to show that the dialogue between Veblen and Menger is 
possible if we consider that their conceptions of institutions, which are fundamentally 
evolutionary, do not stand at the same moments of the analysis of institutions. Each of 29 
 
these two conceptions solves a specific problem: that of the origin of institutions for 
Menger, that of institutional change for Veblen. Even if the two authors developed very 
different epistemological as well as methodological conceptions of economics and 
institutions, my view is that it is possible to  ‘reconcile’ Veblen and Menger’s 
approaches  if one defines an institution  as  carrying a typical behaviour and if we 
proceed to explain two logically distinct types of processes: i) the emergence of a 
typical behaviour amongst  all of the behaviours and  ii) the assertion of a typical 
behaviour amongst all of the typical behaviours. There is then a kind of two steps game, 
one where typical behaviours are selected, the second where one of these typical 
behaviours is selected. 
 
                                                 
Notes  
 
1 I thank G eoffrey Hodgson and Ülrich Witt for useful comments. I’m also grateful to ICER for having 
hosted me as a Fellow when this paper was produced. 
2 Samuels  has  organised a symposium during which  ‘Austrian’ authors (like Boettke) and 
‘Institutionalist’ authors (like Rutherford) debated on the possibility and the content of a comparison 
between the Austrian and I nstitutionalist Schools.  In “Austrian and Institutional Economics: Some 
Common Elements”, Samuels thus writes: “The objective of this paper is to identify certain 
characteristics and elements of thought and analysis which arguably are common to both Austrian and 
Institutional economics” (Samuels, 1989, p. 53).  
3 In this text, Vanberg attempts to show how the  theses of Commons  and Menger are more 
complementary and compatible than conflicting. 
4 Hayek (1968) thus alludes to several generations of the Austrian School. In their history of economic 
thought books, Schumpeter (1954) and Pribram (1983) refer to the Austrian School. O’Driscoll (1977) 
brings up the notion of paradigm to explain the victory of Keynesianism over the Austrians (in fact, the 
victory of Keynes’ ideas over those of Hayek). Wynarczyk (1990) uses the notion of Research Tradition, 
as developed by Laudan (1977), to characterise the Austrian and Institutionalist contributions. Rizzo 
(1982) has defined the characteristics of an Austrian Research Programme in a Lakatosian perspective. 
The works of Parsons (1990) or of Caldwell have shown the heterogeneousness of the Austrian thinking. 
As regards the Institutionalist School, there is a distinction between the ‘Old’ and the ‘New’ Institutional 
Economics (Hodgson, 1989; Langlois, 1986, 1989; Rutherford, 1989), but also the Neo-Institutionalist 
School.  Perlman (1991) shows the fragmented nature of the Old Institutional School. 
5 This assertion is mostly valid for Menger. It is less so for an author such as Hayek. On this point cf. 
Garrouste (1994). 
6 For a precise analysis of this distinction, cf. Kauder (1957), as well as Hutchison (1981), Dufourt & 
Garrouste (1993), or Dos Santos Ferreira & Ege (1991). 
7 The distinction which Menger makes between pragmatic and organic institutions does not relate to a 
difference in the conditions of their emergence, but actually to the distinction he makes between exact 
and realistic-empirical orientation. Indeed, though Menger does say there are social institutions which 
may be of a pragmatic nature, he insists on the fact that an explanation which regards social institutions 
as the unintentional result of individual actions  is more satisfactory.  This is to  be connected to  i) 
Menger’s absence of analysis on the origin of pragmatic institutions (he only gives one instance of such 30 
 
                                                                                                                                               
institutions: the birth of money in colonised countries), and ii) the comment Vanberg makes when he 
defines the status of the ‘organic’ approach in Menger’s works (Vanberg, 1989). (For a presentation of 
this comment, cf. later on). 
8 O’Driscoll quite rightly points out that, in Principles of Economics, the ‘theory of money’ follows the 
‘theory of commodities’ (O’Driscoll, 1986, p. 608). That is why money, in Menger’s works, takes root in 
exchange. 
9 He also includes the works of the Austrian School in his criticism which, for Jaffe, reveals Veblen’s 
poor knowledge, if not utter ignorance, of the works produced by this school of thought (Jaffe, 1976). 
Hodgson expresses a slightly different opinion but argues that Veblen unfortunately blends in his critics 
‘neo-classical’ economics and the Austrian School: “Of course, he was off the mark to associate this 
picture with Austrian theorists such as C. Menger” (Hodgson, 1989, p. 261). 
10 It is interesting to note some propinquity here between Menger and Veblen whose importance we shall 
underline later on. Indeed, the two theorists define methodological characteristics which apply to both 
social sciences and natural sciences. Cf. Veblen (1899, pp. 123-124) and Menger (1963, p. 59, note 18: 
“the contrast between the theoretical natural sciences and the theoretical social sciences is merely a 
contrast of the phenomena which they investigate from a theoretical point of view. It is by no means a 
contrast of method”). 
11 Concerning the relationships between Veblen’s thinking and Marxism,  cf. Aron’s enlightening 
introduction to Théorie de la classe de loisir. 
12 As Hodgson points: “Veblen outlined the problem of reconciling human volition and causality but 
failed to develop an adequate and non-reductionist philosophical framework in which human 
intentionality, monism and causality could be reconciled; without reducing mind to matter, or matter to 
mind. In retrospect, a missing conceptual tool was an explicit and developed concept of emergence in the 
context of a layered ontology.”… “However, emergentist philosophy did not come to maturity until the 
1920s, at the very end of Veblen’s life.” (2004a, 351). Hodgson (2004b) regrets that Veblen did not 
sufficiently made use of the theories of spontaneous order that American sociologists developed around 
1900. Witt (2008) stresses that Veblen proposes a natural (genetic) explanation of the emergence of 
novelty but fail to give a cultural explanation of novelty. 
13 Individualism and holism do not necessarily contradict. They do if we accept the following 
proposition: “If ‘wholes’ exist then they have distinct aims and interests of their own.” (Agassi 1975, 
147).  
14 Dufourt & Garrouste (1993) use the notion of ‘thought’ to characterise the system of coherences which 
exists between the epistemological, methodological and theoretical levels of an author’s intellectual 
system.  
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